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Learning for the natural environment: The case against anthropocentrism 
Kai Horsthemke  
Abstract: The world (Africa in particular) is in a progressive state of environmental crisis, caused by global 
warming, loss of biodiversity, human overpopulation, pollution, massive deforestation and desertification, 
urbanization and many other environmental problems and risk factors. For several commentators and theorists, 
part of the solution resides in the provision of pertinent and adequate education, including environmental 
education. The present paper briefly examines the history of environmental education, internationally and in South 
Africa, and some of its most prominent current trends and issues, before critiquing its general orientation. Arguing 
against what appears to lie at the heart of environmental education and literacy, namely anthropocentrism (ideas 
like “education for sustainable development”), the paper urges a radical rethinking of its central concerns and 
modus operandi, in terms of facilitating learning for the natural environment. In other words, in order to live up to 
its promise of contributing towards life beyond the twenty-first century, such learning must include the realization 
that nature matters in and for itself. 
 
(Wits School of Education, University of the Witwatersrand, P O Wits 2050, South Africa) 
Key words: anthropocentrism; biocentrism; environmental education; sustainable development; sustainable 
use 
 
It isn’t pollution that’s harming the environment. It’s the impurities in our air and water that are doing it. 
—George W. Bush 
Quite frankly, teachers are the only profession that teach our children. 
—George W. Bush 
The world was not given to you by your parents, it was lent to you by your children. 
—Kenyan proverb 
1. Introduction—The state of the planet  
Arguably, one of the greatest challenges—if not the greatest—facing humankind at the beginning of the 21st 
century is the state of our planet, and coupled with this our relationship with the natural environment. Most, if not 
all, other concerns—however significant—are necessarily secondary in this regard. The human impact on the 
environment has been, and continues to be, enormous. Human population growth and advances in technological 
abilities continue producing previously nonexistent environmental problems. What is at stake here is nothing less 
than the survival of the earth in its present state, as being inhabitable, and therefore also human survival. At the 
very least, it is a matter of the quality and conditions of our lives, present and future. If this is correct, it follows 
that one of the greatest priorities—perhaps the greatest—of academic research, scientific, philosophical, 
educational and other, should be into how to arrest and possibly reverse the present decline. 
There are difficulties, of course. The problem is not so much whether or not the diagnoses and prognoses are 
correct. Although doubts by certain scientists and some self-styled experts on climate change, etc. persist, both 
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about the extent of the problem and about the time available for humankind still to react; others claim that global 
warming may not necessarily be bad thing (Stampf, 2007; Stampf & Traufetter, 2007; Traufetter, 2007), it would 
appear that George W. Bush and his advisors, too, fell into this camp. Substantial questions concern the 
description and definition of the approaches, and human beings should adopt in response to the environmental 
predicament/s. Further questions are raised about the metaphysical and ethical foundations of our concern for our 
planet. Should educational policy and practice, for example, be informed by a concern for nature and the 
environment for the (human) purposes? Or should we teach and learn for the natural environment and for itself? 
Interestingly, in their comparative study of different societies and cultures’ textbooks, Boujemaa Agorram, Silvia 
Caravita, Adriana Valente, Daniela Luzi and Nicola Margnelli established that the conception of the relationship 
of humans in respect to nature was characterized in terms of viewing humans as owners of nature and 
environment in opposition with humans as guests of the earth together with other living beings (Agorram, et al., 
2009, p. 30). They discovered that a fairly uniform approach to ecology and environmental problems appears to 
exist, irrespective of “cultural differences” (Agorram, et al., 2009, pp. 25-26), one that contrasts anthropocentric 
perspectives with less (or non-) anthropocentric views—even if the treatment of “ecology (tends to be) rather 
superficial and incomplete” (Agorram, et al., 2009, p. 25). 
It is not the purpose of this paper to present an empirical account of the state of the earth. Facts around 
climate change, global warming, greenhouse gas emissions, extinction of species etc. are well known, and 
findings continue to be publicized and updated (for example, Andrew Goudie’s account of the human impact on 
the natural environment, now in its 6th edition; Goudie, 2006. See also White, 1996; De Beer, Dreyer & Loubser, 
2005; Gore, 2006; Connor, 2007). For the purpose of this introduction, the author wantss to highlight briefly some 
of the implications for Africa, and South Africa in particular, before turning his attention to environmental 
education.  
Involved in the recent drafting of the fourth assessment report by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) were Guy Midgley of the South African National Botanical Institute, Pauline Dube 
(University of Botswana) and Colleen Vogel (University of the Witwatersrand) (reported in Grant, 2007, p. 5). 
Their representative presence and participation were significant for a particular reason. Even in the judgement of 
global warming denialists like Josef Reichholf (Stampf & Traufetter, 2007), the prospects for Africa are dire: 
Africa is the most vulnerable to climate change. Southern Africa, in particular, faces imminent food and water 
shortages (Grant, 2007). South Africa has the third highest level of biodiversity in the world (De Beer, Dreyer & 
Loubser, 2005, p. 4). If, as seems to be a foregone conclusion (Reichholf, 2007), the southern part of Africa is 
going to “dry up”, the implications for biodiversity will be severe. Desertification and deforestation constitute 
substantial threats to biodiversity (De Beer, Dreyer & Loubser, 2005, p. 4). In addition, South Africa, with the 
strongest economy on the continent, accounts for more than half of Africa’s electricity consumption while the 
country’s cheap, dirty coal is the fuel driving development in the subcontinent. It would appear that South Africa’s 
obsession with a six percent growth rate is out of step with its obligation to curb greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
It is, therefore, of the highest importance to counteract “the unreasoned use and … wasting of natural resources, … 
pollution” and “environmental degradation” and to bring about people’s awakening (to) these problems …. Education in 
general, and environmental education in particular, has a significant role in this awakening. It is also a factor of education 
(for) citizenship (Agorram, et al., 2009, p. 26).  
 
According to Pretoria academics Josef de Beer, Johann Dreyer and Callie Loubser: 
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Education is one of the most effective catalysts of change, according to Pretoria academics Josef de Beer, Johann 
Dreyer and Callie Loubser (De Beer, Dreyer & Loubser, 2005, p. 27).  
Society should undertake to educate the people of today to change their ways and to educate younger generations to 
have respect for nature (ibid.). 
Human ideologies require modification. Anthropocentrism needs to give way to ecocentrism as the dominant view of 
the world. If humans are able to see themselves as part of nature, they will also respect forests (for example) as living 
communities, not only as resources to be exploited (De Beer, Dreyer & Loubser, 2005, p. 27). 
 
Strangely enough, no mention is made in the discussion of poverty, here as elsewhere, of the problem of 
overpopulation in this regard. If poverty means people cannot afford to take proper care of the environment or live 
an environmentally aware life, and if poverty is caused in part by overcrowding and reckless (or, at best, 
unthinking) procreation, it is clear where education should begin. 
2. A brief history of environmental education 
From a relatively simple and narrowly conceived concern for conservation or with human-environment 
relationships (approximately 60 years ago) to a more sophisticated interpretation or acceptance of multiple levels 
and layers of concern (spanning ethics, politics, culture and sociology), environmental education has become a 
complex professional field embracing ecological knowledge and understanding (Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, pp. 
35-36). The first phase of the more sophisticated or nuanced understanding yielded a definition of environmental 
education that reflected a scientific, rational, linear and developmental view of education. Later, it was replaced by 
one that included a stronger focus on social critique and social change (Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, p. 37).  
Pat Irwin and Heila Lotz-Sisitka point out that there is early evidence of environmental education in China, 
India, Egypt, Greece and—according to oral records—sub-Sahara Africa (ibid.). They refer to the Industrial 
Revolution as the chief cause of the alienation of human beings (what about Cartesian dualism?)—which also 
propelled a new wave of environmental concern in Europe and America (Wordsworth, Thoreau, Darwin, 
Kropotkin and Audubon). The importance of an understanding of the natural environment in a child’s education, 
long acknowledged by indigenous people the world over, was famously recognized by Rousseau, and later by 
Pestalozzi and Emerson. In 1874 Ernst Haeckel coined the term “ecology” (“the study of our home”—from Greek 
oikos: “home”), which was prominently embraced by Scottish professor of botany Patrick Geddes. Environmental 
education landmarks of the 20th century were Rachel Carson’s book Silent Spring (1962) and the establishment of 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF). Milestones in the development of environmental education on a global scale were the 1972 UN 
Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, as well as the 1977 Conference on Environmental 
Education in Tbilisi (Georgia, then USSR) (Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, pp. 39-40).  
Since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the development of environmental education has been widely 
influenced by the notions of sustainable development and, in particular, “education for sustainability”, with many 
educators advocating that environmental education should, in fact, be focused primarily on achieving the goals of 
sustainable development (Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, pp. 42-43). The notion of sustainable development, first 
articulated in the 1987 Bruntlandt Report for the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), 
has received global support. Sustainable development is defined as “development that meets the needs of present 
generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (WCED, 1987, p. 43; 
Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, pp. 43-47; Odora Hoppers, 2008, p. 29).  
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Tellingly, the spirit here is clearly anthropocentric. Only the needs of humans (present and future) are 
mentioned, not the needs of nonhuman beings or the value of ecosystems and the environment. A similar spirit 
informs the Kenyan proverb cited at the beginning of this paper: “The world was not given to you by your parents, 
it was lent to you by your children” (Stewart, 2004, p. 137).  
 
In the African context, Catherine Odora Hoppers, indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) specialist and former 
University of Pretoria scholar, the relationship with, and to nature, human agency, and human solidarity, for instance, 
underpins the knowledge system and the human existence around it. Relationships between people hold pride of place, 
expressed in the various philosophies across Africa and best captured by the African concept of Ubuntu—a 
human-trophic philosophy … (Odora Hoppers, 2008, p. 30). 
 
Ubuntu is an explicitly anthropocentric idea that has conceptual equivalents (botho or hunhu, to mention just 
two) in many other African languages and cultures. Muntu umuntu ngabantu (or motho ke motho ka batho) means 
“A human being is human because of other human beings”, and also “I am because we are”—where “we” signals 
not only the collective but also (and especially) membership of the human species. Therefore, the environmental 
and ecological concern expressed by appeals to ubuntu, by definition, can not be a concern for the environment 
(the nonhuman biosphere) in and for itself. It is valued only either because human beings are part of it, or because 
it constitutes a (set of) resource(s) for (present or future) human beings to draw on. 
A significant development linked to the Rio Summit was the development of a Treaty on Environmental 
Education for Sustainable Societies, which was adopted at a plenary meeting by the International Forum of NGOs 
and Social Movements. Amongst others, the NGO forum principles emphasize “the value of indigenous 
knowledge and skills, and recognize the socially constructed nature of knowledge” (both of which are contentious 
principles; I return to this point below), as well as the need to promote cultural, linguistic and ecological diversity, 
principles that understandably became popular in South African environmental education processes after 1994 
(Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, pp. 44-45). While many educators agree that the agenda of sustainability should be 
furthered by education, some educators have begun to question the instrumental rationality adopted by much of 
the education for sustainability “doctrine”, and the assumptions that sustainability provides an adequate 
conceptual framework for education (Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, p. 46).  
 
The Environmental Education Association of South Africa (EEASA), established in 1992, was regarded with 
considerable suspicion. From its inception, EEASA promoted the idea that the people of southern Africa have many 
interests in common, particularly on environmentally related issues, than those which have often been used to create 
divisions between them. Most significantly, it has argued that: “We share one environment and the better we share it and 
collectively care for it, the better quality future all of us are likely to have” (Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, pp. 48-49). 
 
In the transformation of South Africa, following the 1994 elections, environmental issues and environmental 
education have become intimately entwined with human rights and social justice issues, as well as ecological and 
biophysical issues (Irwin & Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, p. 53). The 1995 White Paper on Education and Training set the 
scene for ongoing environmental education curriculum development work: “… environmental education, 
involving an interdisciplinary, integrated and active approach to learning, must be a vital element of all levels and 
programmes of the education and training system, in order to create environmentally literate and active citizens 
and ensure that all South Africans, present and future, enjoy a decent quality of life through the sustainable use of 
resources” (Department of Education, 1995, p. 18). Again, the anthropocentrism of this focus is noteworthy. 
3. Education for sustainability 
Learning for the natural environment: The case against anthropocentrism 
 26 
Alluding to the definition provided in the Bruntlandt Report (WCED, 1987), Lesley Le Grange and Callie 
Loubser acknowledge that the meaning of sustainable development as “development that takes place in such a 
way that it does not compromise the needs of future generations” (Le Grange & Loubser, 2005, p. 114) has been 
criticized for its anthropocentrism. Yet, they claim, “sustainable development is not a monolithic entity, and a 
more nuanced understanding of the concept could incorporate values such as interspecies equity, e.g. that all living 
organisms have the right to being treated decently and to be protected from cruelty” (ibid.: for a “more nuanced 
understanding”; Bonnett, 2003, chapter 9; Wals, 2007). 
After distinguishing between two alternative conceptions of sustainable development, conservative and 
radical, Le Grange and Loubser contend that these should not necessarily be seen as discrete categories but rather 
as opposite ends of a continuum (Le Grange & Loubser, 2005, p. 114). It is this tension between conservation 
needs on the one hand and development needs on the other that constitutes the beginning of environmental 
education’s association with sustainability (Le Grange & Loubser, 2005, p. 115). For some, the authors say, 
sustainable development is the ultimate goal of environmental education: hence the phrase “environmental 
education for sustainability”: 
 
For others, sustainable development encompasses specific objectives that should be added to those of environmental 
education, thus the expression “education for environment and sustainable development”. For still others, environmental 
education inherently includes education for sustainable development, thus rendering the distinction between the two 
meaningless (Le Grange & Loubser, 2005, p. 116).  
 
Le Grange and Loubser fail to interrogate critically these different conceptions. There is, clearly, a distinction 
between “education for the environment” and “education for sustainable development”—at least as the latter is 
commonly understood, that is, from an anthropocentric perspective. It comes as no surprise, then, that the authors 
should claim that different conceptions of environment, education and sustainability should coexist (Le Grange & 
Loubser, 2005, p. 117). They do acknowledge the “dangers in uncritically accepting a plethora of concepts that we 
use in environmental education”, before reiterating their view that there should be an appreciation of the diversity 
of meanings and usage of the concept of sustainability, but also that such meanings should be (re)clarified within 
specific sites and discourses of environmental education (ibid.). Sustainability, they claim, is a polysemous 
concept. Its diversity of meanings should be celebrated and continuously (re)clarified …, so that sustainability 
(sustainable development) becomes a reflective social process rather than a fixed idea (Le Grange & Loubser, 
2005, p. 120). 
This strikes me as a somewhat anemic move, as trying to invoke an unfeasible compromise. Surely, this 
cannot mean that all meanings, uses and applications are equally valid. Some are legitimately criticized as worth 
rejecting, not least because of an underlying, unargued presumption in favour of anthropocentrism. Take the study 
of environmental education and training the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) undertook in 1997, 
amongst the key findings of which was the following: “Definitions of environmental training had progressed from 
an association with nature conservation to a more people- and industry-based perspective” (Lotz-Sisitka, 2005, pp. 
166-167). If this constitutes progress, the future is indeed bleak. And if this definition is to be celebrated, rather 
than critically interrogated, it is even bleaker. 
While “sustainable development” and “sustainable use” are arguably oxymorons, sustainability might 
nonetheless be used as a benchmark, regarding our (human) impact on the planet—not taking out more than we 
put in, so to speak. This indicates a kind of banking model, but perhaps (in the absence of a more appropriate term) 
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“sustainability” will have to do. 
4. The case against anthropocentrism 
Is pollution (e.g. from coal-burning stoves) bad because children in relevant areas suffer more from asthma 
and chest colds than children elsewhere (De Beer, Dreyer & Loubser, 2005, p. 2)? Or is it bad in itself? If an 
anthropocentric response is given, then one is unlikely ever to get beyond fighting the symptoms. 
Stellenbosch philosopher and environmental ethics specialist Johan Hattingh provides a discussion of 
anthropocentric perspectives, in which he makes a distinction between the following value positions: ruthless 
development and exploitation, resource development and conservation, and wilderness preservation—for human 
benefits and enjoyment of unspoilt nature, recreational, aesthetic and the like (Hattingh, 2005, pp. 74-81). 
Although the last looks like non-anthropocentrism, the value of nature and the environment is entirely 
instrumental. The problem here is that their values depend entirely on human recreational and aesthetic benefits. 
Should human preferences change? There would be no axiological basis for concern. 
In ecocentric value positions, by contrast (Hattingh, 2005, pp. 82-89), life in general and ecosystems as 
wholes are accorded intrinsic value—value in and of themselves, regardless of how humans can benefit from them. 
As humans evolved and developed, so did their values—through interaction with the land. According to Aldo 
Leopold, we are therefore not the sole authors of our values. The shift mapped here is one from a focus on 
relations between individuals (the decalogue) via that on the integration of individuals into society (the Golden 
Rule) and integration of social organization to the individual (democracy) to a focus on the relation of human 
individuals to animals, plants and the land (Leopold’s Land Ethic) (Hattingh, 2005, p. 82). 
In his discussion of so-called radical value positions (deep ecology, ecofeminism, social ecology, and 
bioregionalism—all of which might also be termed radical environmentalism), Hattingh perceives an emphasis on 
incisive, definitive and fundamental transformation, in order to address the root causes of our environmental 
problems (Hattingh, 2005, pp. 89-93). According to Hattingh, the practical consequences between this three-way 
split between anthropocentric, ecocentric and radical value positions is that they have no shared vision (but they 
do, arguably!), no unified voice and no common public language to communicate effectively with public decision 
makers and policy formulators (Hattingh, 2005, p. 94). Hattingh considers this the problem of ethical monism in 
environmental ethics—while its advantages are theoretical coherence and internal consistency, it is problematic 
when it comes to the formulation of practical policy proposals (ibid.). Hattingh proposes what he calls 
environmental pragmatism, acknowledgement and acceptance of the coexistence of theories and value positions, 
until a comprehensive environmental ethic emerges. I submit that this, like Le Grange and Loubser’s, is a rather 
pale proposal. By the time such an ethic is imminent that it may already be too late. 
5. Learning for the environment 
According to Dreyer and Loubser (2005, p. 127), there is still no clarity on how environmental education 
should be implemented in the formal education system. “History has shown”, they argue, “that the environment is 
usually low on the political agenda of governments”—which “usually rely on their education system to achieve 
their political ideals” (Dreyer & Loubser, 2005, p. 135). Nonetheless, there appears to be increasing recognition of 
environmental progress at government and education department level.  
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Citing EE link’s principles of environmental education1
(1) Environmental learning is based on knowledge, which is needed to study and solve environmental 
problems and to address environmental challenges; 
, Dreyer and Loubser list the following principles of 
environmental learning: 
(2) Environmental learning should develop the skills needed to study and solve the environmental problems 
and to address environmental challenges; 
(3) Environmental learning should include the affective domain, specifically the attitudes, values and 
commitments needed to ensure a sustainable society (Dreyer & Loubser, 2005, p. 138). 
Apart from its inherent anthropocentrism, a further worrying feature of this kind of approach is its 
constructivist paradigm (Irwin & Sisitka, 2005, pp. 44-45; Schulze, 2005, p. 60). UNISA environmental education 
research expert Cheryl Le Roux also refers to this as “post-positivism”: Post-positivists suggest that truths and 
meanings are relative to the individual standpoint and that different individuals and groups will have competing, 
but equally valid, goals and interpretations of the world (Le Roux, 2005, p. 180). Are these suggestions also 
“relative to the individual standpoint”? And are the goals and interpretations of Hattingh’s “ruthless developer” 
(Hattingh, 2005, pp. 74-76) equally valid, i.e. as valid as those who caution against environmental degradation? 
Le Roux (2005, p. 180) states that the post-positivist paradigm accepts values and perspectives as important 
considerations in the search for knowledge …. Post-positivism challenges conventional assumptions about 
knowledge and subjectivity.  
According to the epistemological and moral paradigm I defend here, a realist accepts values and perspectives 
but maintains a viable position for judging dubious claims and problematic practices, something the 
constructivist/post-positivist arguably has no recourse to. 
A similar response might be given to Pauline Chinn, Chinese-American science-education researcher, from a 
family with roots in Hawaii from the late 19th century (Chinn, 2008a, p. 7). Chinn defends an approach 
connecting sustainability-oriented, indigenous knowledge, practices and values to science knowledge and 
practices (Chinn, 2008a, p. 3), in response to the dominant, anthropocentric culture (Chinn, 2008b, p. 41) of 
mainstream science (Tobin, 2008)2. Apart from the worry that emphasis on “traditional”, “local” or “indigenous 
knowledge” errs in some fundamental respects (all attributable to misconceptions about what “knowledge” 
actually is or involves; Horsthemke, 2008a; Horsthemke, 2008b), there is the additional concern that mainstream 
scientists, industrialists and politicians are likely to listen even less, if warnings about the state of the planet are 
couched in what they would consider “crackpot science”. One might (indeed, should) acknowledge the significant 
contributions by native Hawaiians, indigenous Americans, Aboriginal and San communities to fundamental 
ecological sanity and clear-headedness without committing to any kind of epistemological relativism or eulogy of 
what often amounts to little more than superstition3
                                                        
1 Retrieved from http://
.  
www.eelink.net/principlesofenvironmentaleducation.html. 
2 By contrast, Catherine Odora Hoppers endorses the definition of Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS) … as the sum total of 
the knowledge and skills that people in particular geographic areas possess, and that enable them to get the most out of their 
natural environment (Odora Hoppers, 2008, p. 29; emphasis added). Unlike Chinn’s invocation of “indigenous knowledge”, 
Odora Hoppers’s account is anthropocentric—and explicitly so. The same spirit also pervades the latter’s concluding statements: 
The protection, development and promotion of IKS will … help to improve livelihoods and economic well-bring of local 
communities by ensuring equitable and fair benefit sharing by local communities in the utilisation of the nation’s resources 
(Odora Hoppers, 2008, p. 34). 
3 An example is contained in Chinn’s reference to a cultural landscape where gods dwelt (Chinn, 2008b, p. 41; Horsthemke, 2008b). 
Similarly, Odora Hoppers’s claim, IKS holds that there are sacred places that have to be avoided and must be conserved (Odora 
Hoppers, 2008, p. 30), signals superstition rather than eco-awareness. 
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An alternative proposal that might be advanced here, then, is not environmental learning under this 
description, but rather learning for the environment. The former is close to learning about the environment for the 
sake of human beings and their benefits—which is unlikely to yield fundamental changes. The latter, on the other 
hand, alludes to the consideration that the environment matters in and for itself. While this way of learning might 
be argued to acknowledge the environment’s intrinsic value or moral status, I am content to proceed more 
cautiously. Rather than asserting that everyone (every natural existent) has intrinsic value or moral status, I would 
want to argue, hypothetically, that if human beings do, paradigmatically, then (for reasons of consistency and 
coherence) these considerations must be extended beyond the species boundary of homo sapiens (While present 
space does not permit making a comprehensive case for the kind of biocentrism I have in mind, I wish to direct 
the readers’ attention to the Appendix, for a brief overview of the architecture of moral status.). Dreyer and 
Loubser state, quite plausibly—before they resort to sustainability talk, learners should acquire values such as an 
appreciation of the resilience, fragility and beauty of the environment, and the interdependence and importance of 
all life forms (Dreyer & Loubser, 2005, p. 139). I submit that these values are not obviously culturally relative but 
—on the contrary—transcultural, and co-extensive with learning active engagement and participation in the real 
world and for the environment. 
Environmental education so reconceptualized encompasses both learning for the environment, nature and 
animals and learning for learners, insofar as it produces in them a sense of empowerment and autonomy, a sense 
that one’s contribution matters, of being able to make a difference. The kind of realist and biocentric pedagogy 
envisaged here has additional implications for learning. It gives new meaning to the idea of human 
freedom—which is not expressed in terms of being free to develop and subjugate anything that can be developed 
and subjugated, but rather in terms of humans being freed from the (historical) role—and frequently perceived 
function—of more or less ruthless developer and subjugator. “Learning for the natural environment” takes the 
anti-discrimination argument to its next logical and practical level. It is not only anti-sexist, anti-classist and 
anti-racist—it is also anti-speciesist4
 
. 
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Appendix: 
The architecture of moral status (adapted from Horsthemke, 1993) 
Primary moral status—directly morally considerable Secondary moral status—indirectly morally considerable 
All living organisms 
All non-living natural/environmental 
entities that enable the existence of living 
organisms 
Learning for the natural environment: The case against anthropocentrism 
 31 
Moral subjects Moral objects Moral objects 
All organisms with a central nervous system, who 
are the subjects of a life that can be better or 
worse for them: humans, more complex animals 
All organisms lacking 
subjectivity/individuality: 
simpler animals, plants 
Soil, air, water, rocks, minerals, sand, 
ozone layer, the sun, etc 
Moral agents Moral recipients Moral recipients Moral recipients 
All individuals capable of 
acting on principle/ 
reconsidering their motives, 
who can be held morally 
accountable 
All individuals 
lacking, but who 
can be harmed/ 
benefited by, moral 
agency 
All organisms lacking 
subjectivity/individuality who 
can be harmed/ benefited by, 
agency (the actions and 
omissions of agents) 
All inanimate natural/environmental 
entities at the receiving end of agency (the 
actions and omissions of agents) 
 
 
